“The EU Enlargement and the Polish-American Special Relationship" 
Presented by Dr Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs
at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, September 22, 2004 

Ladies and Gentleman,
I would like to express my gratitude to the Institute for the Study of Europe at Columbia University, the East Central European Center, the Kosciuszko Foundation-Semper Polonia Foundation, and the American Polish Advisory Council for inviting me to inaugurate the second year of the Polish Study program. We consider this program to be an important channel to facilitate knowledge about contemporary Poland. This is particularly valuable in a period of rapid and profound changes. Both our countries are changing and the whole international environment is in a stage of deep transformation with all the risks and opportunities involved. As part of the new realities it has been already several months that Poland is a Member of the European Union. The enlargement closed a chapter in the European history. The post-war division of Europe is finally overcome. The membership in the European Union means the fulfillment of the last of the strategic goals of the Polish foreign policy as set forth more than ten years ago by the political class of the free and sovereign Poland. The EU membership will have far-reaching consequences for both the domestic development and the Polish foreign policy. We see it as the main vehicle for our modernization - in all its aspects. As much as it will change Poland, the enlargement will also have a considerable impact both on the European Union itself and its relations with the United States. Through its membership in the European Union, Poland has been afforded new opportunities to influence the shaping of the European-American relations. Therefore, one of the assets that Poland is bringing into the European Union are friendly and close relations with the United States. The importance of the special relationship between Poland and the United States has thus acquired a new dimension. Ladies and Gentlemen,
The political contacts between Poland and the US have reached in the recent period quite an unprecedented level. The United States regard Poland as one of its closest allies, as evidenced quite recently in the public pronouncements of President George Bush and other American leaders. Meetings between the leaders of our two countries are frequent and exceptionally candid. The present climate of political affinity is the result of a natural and long-term process. This process has its roots in the support offered by the United States to our quest for independence and full sovereignty. It is a logical step to the particularly close ties established in the context of NATO and the shaping of the new security environment in Europe. These contacts rest on the solid foundation of common history and on the trustful friendship between people of the two countries. What is cementing these ties today is not just mutual gratitude and recollection of the past, but the shared goals of our actions and the determination to face present threats and challenges together. In this regard, the important political catalyst of our particular closeness has been the common fight against terrorism. The Polish support to the military action against Saddam Hussein and our role in the stabilization process in Iraq gained us true friends in Washington. Although these decisions in Poland were not easy to take, they proved to be the right ones. Our decisions were not taken on the basis of tactical considerations. We were not calculating what we can win from this or that choice. We did not expect to make political profits or economic gains. The decision to support the invasion of Iraq was mainly based on our understanding of the true meaning of alliance and solidarity, also with the Iraqi people. The offer extended to Poland to take over one of the zones of responsibility in Iraq was both an opportunity and a real risk. We had no illusion about how difficult the task would be. We hope that the situation in Iraq will normalize to the extent that would no longer necessitate a large foreign military presence and would also allow us to reduce the size of our contingent. But we have a sense of commitment and responsibility. We will stick to our commitment. The process of stabilization in Iraq is still facing many difficulties. But in our view, that should not be a pretext to judge who was right and who was wrong. There is no place for Schadenfreude. For all the international community it is more important to concentrate the energy on the future and try to co-operate closely for the success of the stabilization roadmap. The stabilization of Iraq is not only in the interest of the Iraqi people or of the coalition. It is in everyone's interest, including Iraq's neighboring states, the United Nations, the European Union, and other international and regional actors. It is also in the interest of relations between the West and the Muslim world. We all want Iraq to be sovereign, stable, democratic and prosperous. We are perfectly aware that the question of Iraq dominates the political agenda in the U.S. We do not underestimate the influence that the Iraqi stabilization has on the American public and its foreign policy. However, we have to look beyond Iraq Ladies and Gentlemen,
The war in Iraq, even if of fundamental importance for the entire global order, is only one episode, also in the context of the transatlantic relations. We do not neglect the impact of the Iraqi crisis on the transatlantic relations, but rather than being considered as a turning point, it should be treated like a lesson which should be translated into the rules that would help guide the transatlantic relationship post 9/11 and post Iraq. Indeed, the transatlantic relations are facing today much more fundamental dilemma. They should be undoubtedly seen in the broader context of the long-term challenges and threats, vividly exposed in the aftermath of 9/11, such as terrorism, the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and growing number of states in distress and failed states. The transatlantic relations occupy in the Polish foreign policy a special place. We can never feel confident and secure if the transatlantic relations are under strain. Their value is in bringing together the important allies and partners of Poland within a strong multilateral framework. Fostering these relations is the highest Polish imperative. It is our intention to use all the assets of the Polish-American relations to provide a modest, but constructive contribution to meet the challenges that the transatlantic community is facing today. We do not want to choose between America and Europe, we want to ensure a better harmony of action between them, based on common interests and values. Although many were trying to juxtapose these aspects of our foreign policy and portray them as a dilemma of choice, we see no contradiction between our European commitments and the special relations of Poland with the United States. Europe and the United States will remain the key players in the security environment for the foreseeable future, and there is a role to play for the Polish-American partnership in strengthening and fostering this genuine and effective cooperation. We need this renewed transatlantic interaction for many reasons. One of the most compelling in the strategic sense is the need to build a new global order. The transatlantic cooperation is the sine qua non condition to solve the world's problems. We must move more actively to restore the sense of predictability shaken by the demise of the old Cold-War system and the recent crises like the Iraqi one. Ladies and Gentlemen,
The process of strengthening the transatlantic cooperation very much depends on how America and Europe will define their respective identities in today's world. There is an internal discussion on both sides of the Atlantic as to how this identity should be shaped. Several options are still open.

One possibility, at least theoretically, might be the inward-looking preoccupation with its own problems by either side which would amount to a quasi isolationism, both European and American. It is, however, very unlikely, bearing in mind the globalization process resulting in growing interdependencies and interconnectedness. Moreover, the attacks of 9/11 ended any illusion of a country being immune to external risks. Therefore, it is in Poland's deep interest to prevent tendencies of isolationism and support American and European active roles in resolving challenges and threats.

Another option that the United States and Europe could choose is the egoistic defense of their interests abroad based on a do-it-alone approach. Such policy would be short-sighted and in the long-run counterproductive.

Therefore, we put our stake on a third model which would provide for an active role of the US in reshaping the international system and in building a new international order accompanied by a more visible European role. We approach the American preponderance as an asset - a force for positive change. The United States has undoubtedly the very potential for leadership. For this leadership, however, to be effective, it has to be co-operative and based upon the principles and rules acceptable by the members of the international community.

In our view, the future international order should not be defined by the number of poles. The concept of multipolarity, sometimes used in other European capitals to criticize the U.S, is not appealing. It brings back the memories of spheres of influences or zones of domination. For us, the new order should be based on solid values and principles, including democracy, human rights, democratic governance, and social justice.

Europe is America's natural partner in fostering a new international order, based on common values and principles. But that would not be enough. While reinforcing our mutual dialog, we have to recognize the rising importance of other global actors, including China and India, and the fact that their perceptions of global risks and challenges as well as their priorities sometimes differ from ours considerably. To be effective our actions must generate the broadest possible consensus in the international community and the public opinion. Consequently, these actions must be based on international law, principles of human rights, and universally shared values. This process requires both the U.S. as the only world superpower, and the UN as a framework institution recognized by its 190 member states, therefore indispensable. We have to make a better use of multilateral mechanisms provided by the United Nations and it is in our interest to involve it as much as possible. More than others, the United States and Europe have a special responsibility in this regard.

Despite all its shortcomings, the UN is the only international organization with the source of global legitimacy. However, to ensure its credibility and necessary effectiveness, a certain code of conduct should be developed. It would give us sufficient predictability as to how we, the members of the United Nations, will act on the international scene, when we will employ the United Nations as our instrument of choice, as well as how we will make a better use of its potential. Poland has made concrete proposals for the UN reform as formulated in the concept of a New Political Act for the United Nations.

We recognize the fact that the United States has a more pragmatic view on the UN, focused mainly on problem-solving and current agenda. Today, without the United States, the United Nations will never be reformed. The central political question for the UN is how to inscribe the unquestionable U.S. might - military, economic, and cultural - into the parameters of the United Nations' system. The necessary cooperation to establish a stable and sovereign Iraq is one of several examples of shared interests between the US and UN. Others include fighting terrorism, confronting the environmental threats and infectious diseases, monitoring human rights, and humanitarian intervention. These are important multilateral tasks where cooperation has comparative advantages. For that, we obviously need a new strategic deal between the U.S. and the UN which will change the existing perception of the UN and transform it into a real vehicle for action.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Regarding the European identity, Poland sincerely believes in the necessity to develop a more proactive role for Europe as a global actor. We deeply believe that the mechanisms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy should be strengthened. Our efforts to establish the European defense identity are aimed at acquiring the capabilities that will enable us to face increasingly diverging and complex situations, capabilities that offer more options to the EU when confronted with crises. The benefits of a more active Europe were clear during the first autonomous EU operation in Bunia, in Congo, making it possible to respond within an extremely short time to the risk of a major disaster in one of the regions of Africa.

We have no doubt that the European integration and the strong common European identity on the world scene will be beneficial not only for Europe, but also for the United States. One partner, even if with diverging views and different perception of the existing challenges, is much easier to communicate with, than several ones. At the same time, we see as a particular role for Poland to help to ensure that the new European security and defense policy is not defined in opposition to the United States.

Many view the increased number of the EU members as the main obstacle to shape the European identity. That would be the wrong diagnosis. All the new members, and Poland in particular, want to develop strong credentials as true Europeans. In terms of obstacles it would be rather the difficulty in the harmonization of interests of big members, in particular of those who have built their national identity as countries actively involved outside Europe, in particular as colonial powers. Poland is confident that eventually Europe will speak with a common and more powerful voice but a voice which would sound in unison on the most strategic issues with the US voice. That would not exclude differences of views and opinions. But in such cases Europe and the United States must learn how to differ.

We do not want to underestimate the challenges that the European-American strategic partnership may face in the near future, among them the question on how to address the nuclear program of Iran. Poland believes in the necessity to harmonize and coordinate the response to this challenge.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
We perfectly understand that, compared to the years of the Cold War, Europe is seen now through a different prism in Washington. The European partner is no longer threatened by existential threats. Europe is no longer the battlefront in a global stand-off. But even then, Europe is by no means less important for U.S security interests. It would be a big mistake to assume that Europe no longer matters.

On the other side, even if Europe no longer needs the U.S protection and is able to solve its local security problems on its own, Poland believes that the U.S., acting among others through the NATO alliance but also through the OSCE and other channels, should be still regarded as a European power. We still need the U.S. as the balancing element in Europe.

The crucial, sometimes decisive, role of the United States in transforming Europe was seen, in particular, in Central Europe, or more recently in the Balkans. The task of transformation in Europe is not over yet. There is still the unfinished business - above all the modernization of Eastern Europe, including the anchoring of Ukraine in the Western family, the stabilization in South Caucasus as well as in other parts of the post-Soviet space. This task cannot be done without the active role of the United States. That is also a natural space for the Polish-American joint action.

As much as we understand the unavoidable shift of the strategic attention by the United States towards the Middle East, it should be not done at the expense of Eastern Europe. These are decisive years for the future geopolitics in the East of Europe. What policy choice will take Russia after Beslan? What direction will be chosen by Ukraine? How to encourage the right choice? How to prevent next five lost years in Belarus? We need an active and imaginative US answer to these strategic questions.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
The transatlantic relations deserve to be reflected upon also in terms of how we conduct the dialog. The traditional leading platform of the transatlantic cooperation - NATO - is undergoing a profound transformation process. NATO to a lesser degree is going to be the formula of the military-political presence of the United States in Europe turning itself into a mechanism for American-European partnership in addressing security challenges outside Europe. It is already now involved in Afghanistan, it should be more present in Iraq. We should be prepared for more such roles in the future. Poland supports NATO's engagement outside Europe because it would give NATO the new raison d'etre and foster its reflection on future tasks, areas of responsibility, and the structure of the Alliance.

For us it is important that the traditional function of NATO - that of collective defense - remains its primary role. NATO will have to change but for Poland, a country of medium size, such values like the collective spirit of joint action remain essential. Alliance is preferable to coalitions of the willing, it is preferable to toolboxes.

At the same time, we also have to accept the truth that NATO is not the only platform of transatlantic relations. A new important platform has emerged based on the cooperation between the United States and European Union, which should not be neglected. We as Poland would wish to have in the US-EU dialog a comparably strong voice as we have in NATO.

You may ask - why NATO is still so important to us? Having the special relationship with the U.S and a new sense of security ensured by the EU, the unique role of NATO is - as I said - in bringing the full range of guaranties by all our strategic allies into a single framework, including the U.S and our European neighbors, like Germany. We consider the cooperation within NATO and the bilateral Polish-American security cooperation to be mutually reinforcing. We would expect that the level and scope of the Polish-American military cooperation will grow reflecting the privileged political realtionship. There are concrete projects and ideas on our side which we would hope be seen favorably by our American partners. That would be the best way to extend our special defense links beyond the Iraqi context.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
A special relationship between the U.S and Poland is not given once for all. It needs constant attention and awareness. We have made use of windows of opportunity. But we must think of new ones.

We as Poland offered solidarity with America when some of its closest partners showed their discontent with American policies. But things in the transatlantic family are coming back to normal. Some key European partners will sooner or later rebuild good relations with the United States. Poland will be working with this objective in mind, even if it means that our relative importance in the U.S foreign policy will be diminished. At the same time, we believe that Poland among the European partners has something special to offer to the United States.

First, our affinity with the U.S is not subject to political fluctuations and electoral changes in Poland and is based on a broad consensus of the political class. The Polish foreign policy will become increasingly subject to domestic disputes but the US-Polish special relationship will always remain a policy axiom.
Second, we are a key state for the stabilization in Eastern Europe which is a region still strategically important to America.
Third, we are faithful to our alliances and commitments. That's one of the national features of our character we can be really proud of. We can be relied upon.

Therefore this special relationship also from the part of the United States is a good investment. As such needs to be reinforced and solidified. Our political relationship has to be developed in the first place into a network of contacts, consultations, and other forms of cooperation at various levels between both state and non-state sectors. Moreover, it has to be supported by strong economic links. Unfortunately, the trade volume is still low; the investment flow is still beyond our expectations. We hoped that F-16 contract would encourage American business to explore new opportunities in Poland and to provide the necessary technological engagement and impetus. We still cannot be satisfied with the results of the offset.

Our official contacts must be seen as convincingly substantiated by the public opinion. In this context, I want to mention the very sensitive issue of visa requirement for Polish citizens going to the United States. We fully understand American concerns and legal procedures in this regard but the present situation is unsustainable. The recent arrangement concerning Immigration Advisory procedure at the Okęcie Airport is a positive step. We have to work together on new steps following the logic of a roadmap towards visa-waiver.

We must also work together towards expanding cooperation in science and scientific exchange. Poland would be interested in increased scholarship programs, in the establishments of outposts of American think-tanks in Poland, in the creation of joint Polish-American regional centers supporting the reform in Eastern Europe. We are afraid that in the absence of new initiatives, the traditional links with the US in our scientific community will be less attractive that the new possibilities afforded by the membership in the EU. That would be not beneficial.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
When the famous French writer Moliere instructed on the difference between poetry and prose, he argued that although poetry may be beautiful, prose is the daily bread of people's life. Let us take it to our hearts also when speaking about international relations. Governments may exchange promises and declarations and we need it this political poetry very much but this must be complemented by the prose with which we solve the existing mundane problems. The Polish-American relations need still some good prose and I am sure they will get it.

is not a world power and do not make pretension to high roles. Being a member of the European Union could make, however, Poland a useful component in the relationship between America and Europe. On the other side, Poland needs both Europe and America. Without both, our political and economic engagement becomes far more limited and our voice on the international scene much weaker.

Thank you for your attention.